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The current functional doctrines of the Large Army Forma-
tion (Corp, Division, Brigade) Command Posts are, more or
less, refined extensions of doctrinal concepts which were in
use for three centuries. These functional doctrines have
survived until today because they have been in general success-
ful and effective. Today however we are entering a new era.
New effective weapon systems, often with embedded computers,
introduce the impersonal mass destruction of the enemy by
long-range indirect and direct fire, requiring complete,
precise and especially timely information on the battlefield
status. Thus the traditional staff function will not be
effective enough in the modern warfare unless automated infor-
mation processing means are studied, designed, developed and
used.
This thesis analyzes the Large Army Formation (LAF) as an
information system, identifies and defines the functional
automation of the staff and provides a preliminary and basic
source study for future detailed investigation on the feasi-
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I. THE LAF AS AN INFORMATION SYSTEM [1,2,3]
A. MISSION, GOAL, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE LAF
1. Definition of the LAF
The LAF is an army unit that comprises a balanced
force of essential ground arms and services so organized and
equipped as to make it tactically and administratively self-
contained. That is, it can conduct by its own means ground
operations of general importance. It can strike or pene-
trate effectively, maneuver readily over any type of terrain
and absorb reinforcing units easily.
2
.
Mission of the LAF
The mission of the LAF can be any or all of the
following:
a. To seize and secure an area and to deny its use to
the enemy.
b. To dominate key or vital land areas and their popu-
lation and resources.
c. To destroy or capture enemy military forces.
3. Goal of the LAF
The goal of the LAF is the successful fulfillment
of its specified mission.
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4.
Objectives of the LAF
The objectives of the LAF are concrete and specific
accomplishments necessary to the achievement of its goal.
The main objectives of the LAF are:
a. With respect to Personnel
Good Health
High degree of Training and Education
Discipline and High Morale
2b. With respect to Equipment
High Performance
Good Maintenance







Dependency and Relations Among Mission , Objectives
and Goal
The mission of the LAF is expressed by the military
manuals in a general manner and needs to be specified ex-
plicitly either by the orders of the LAF's superior echelon
or by the LAF's command. This specification is an aftermath
of considerations of several factors like the strength and
the operational ability of the LAF, the strength and behavior
These must not be confused with the terrain objectives
on the battlefield.
2Weapons, Munition, Ammunition, Vehicles, Facilities, Supplies
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of the enemy, the land morphology, the weather conditions.
As these factors are related to time, they confound the
tactical situation. The mission's specification is an adapta-
tion over time. The estimation of the situation is a con-
tinuing process and changed conditions may call for a new
decision at any time that could modify the mission's
specification.
The objectives of the LAF are dependent on the mission's
adaptation in a considerable way. For example, military
operations conducted under conditions of extreme cold and
deep snow require special equipment and training for the
LAF designated to conduct such operations. The objectives
are also strongly related to each other. For example, a
high degree of personnel training results in good maintenance
and performance of the equipment. The high performance of
the equipment facilitates the personnel training. A high
degree of personnel training and high performance of the
equipment leads to an effective functioning of the system.
The achievement of the LAF's goal is exclusively
dependent on the accomplishment of its objectives. Moreover,
the achievement or failure of the goal can cause an adapta-
tion of the mission. For example, after a successful attack
when the enemy is no longer able to maintain his position,
then the mission of the LAF must enter a new phase; a pursuit
must be launched.
Figure 1 . 1 shows the dependency and the relations
among mission, objectives and goal of the LAF.
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6 . The LAF Is a Closed Loop System
A system is a combination of diverse but interacting
elements integrated to achieve its overall purpose. The
elements may be devices and/or human beings concerned with
processing materials, information and energy. A feedback
loop for returning part of the output to the input in order
to improve performance is an important functional component
in many systems. The concept of feedback is not new; it is
inherent in many biological systems, and it is found in well-
established social systems. However the formulation of the
principles of feedback is a recent achievement, credited to
H.S. Black in his studies in 1934, and exploitation of this
new understanding has come in just the last few years.
The LAF is a feedback or a closed loop system. That
is, it provides command and staff with a comparison of both
actual and desired output. The input of the LAF is its speci-
fied mission, the desired output is either the accomplishment
of its objectives in the time of peace or the achievement of
its goal in the time of war. This comparison can trigger
the LAF ' s command and staff to take action in order to bring
desired and actual output into correspondence. So the compari-
son of desired and actual output requires an explicitly docu-
mented specification of the mission and a measurement of the
actual output. The measurement of the actual output comes
from either evaluations with respect to the LAF ' s objectives




Each closed loop or feedback system is effective if
it can respond fast for the necessary control action. Other-
wise the time lapse maybe so great that belated control action
can make the situation worse [Ref . 1, p. 61] . Such systems
are said to be unstable. In an unstable system, a random
disturbing input may give rise to decoordination of the
system. The LAF is an unstable system, thus a sudden unfore-
seen enemy action, the lack of fast control response or
misestimation of the situation can often be a catastrophe
for the LAF. By nature, an unstable system is difficult to
control. On the other hand, the requirements for certain
results of a military action impose difficult planning prob-
lems for the staff, who are the control engineers of the LAF.
The use of automated tools will be, if not a panacea, at
least a means to maximize the control abilities of the staff
and to minimize the unforeseen situations.
Figure 1.2 presents the LAF as a closed loop system.
B. THE LAF: A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The LAF is a system which is composed of two smaller
entities which are also systems. These systems are the
LAF ' s staff, a planning and control functional system and the
totality of the LAF subordinate echelons which constitute
an executive system. These systems are also divided into
subsystems. This work focuses on the staff since the sub-
systems of the executive system (small groups and units) are
beyond its scope.
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The Staff and Its Subsystems
The mission of the staff is:
1. To conduct methodical analysis of any tactical or
procedural problem in the activities of the LAF , to
elaborate fast, precise and satisfactory solutions
and to present these solutions to the LAF's Commander
General Officer in order to reach a decision.
2. To interpret with accuracy the decisions of the General
into orders and to issue these orders at the proper
time.
3. To always be informed in time on the situation and




To be able to quickly control and coordinate the
operations
.
5. To minimize the probability of errors.
6. To relieve, as much as possible, the Commander General
from the supervision of activities that are not vitally
important
.
The basic subsystems of the staff are those of personnel,
intelligence, operations and logistics. These subsystems
have a number of significant functions that should be
considered.
1. Personnel
Personnel functions are intended to keep the LAF in-
formed on personnel strength, the administrative situation,
15
the current battle personnel needs and changes in priority.
These functions include:
a. Developing Estimates
b. Maintaining LAF ' s Strength Status




Intelligence functions are intended to provide the
LAF with intelligence information on which to base current
tactical decisions. The functions performed include:
a. Planning of Information Collection
b. Information Collection Management
c. Information Analysis and Verification
d. Dissemination of Analysis Products
e. Coordination of Counterintelligence
f. Coordination of Informants
g. Planning and Coordination of Reconnaissance.
3 Operations and Training
Operations and training functions are intended to
support the LAF by having highly trained personnel and by
controlling immediate combat operations and sustaining battle
The functions performed include:
a. Preparation of Training and Education Plans
b. Coordination of Training
c. Coordination and Processing Evaluations
d. Preparation of Operation Plans
e. Coordination of Tactical Troop Movements
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f. Coordination of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons
g. Maintaining an Operation's Estimate
h. Planning and Processing Air Support Requests
i. Supervision of Electronic Warfare.
4 . Logistics
Logistics functions are intended to coordinate the
logistics requirements of the LAF with the tactical aspects
of the LAF ' s activities. The functions performed include:
a. Planning Supply, Services, and Maintenance
b. Monitoring the Logistic Situation and Capability
c. Monitoring the Medical Activity
d. Monitoring the Airlifting of the LAF.
A well-working staff speeds up the elaboration of
the information and transforms it to useful material for
decision making. The introduction of automated information
processing means will make the staff more productive by mini-
mizing the delays in the preparation and distribution of the
estimations, plans, and directions.
C. THE LAF'S INFORMATION NEEDS
The information that a LAF must elaborate to meet its
operational needs is generated by its internal reporting
structure and by its external environment as well.
The information generated is not simply useful to any
army unit but is of vital importance. The whole mission's
adaptation is based on the information generated in the LAF '
s
17
internal and external environment. Good exploitation of
information leads to better estimations of the situation
which leads to better decision making. Lack of information
or misinterpretation of the information may be fatal, not
only for the success of a tactical action on the battlefield
but also for the existence of the unit itself. We could say
that no tactical action is possible without information--it
is the oxygen for every army organism on the battlefield.
Because of this "starvation" for information, there is the
intelligence subsystem of the staff which has as its primary
role the coverage of the needs of the LAF for exploitable
information.
Fig. 1.4 shows the LAF ' s main information generators.
At each management level, the specific requirements for
information vary. The different information uses and re-
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Figure 1.5: LAF Information Requirements & Uses.
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II. MODELING A STAFF ASSISTANT COMPUTER SYSTEM (SACS) [4,5]
A. AUTOMATION NEEDS—EXPECTATIONS
Before making the configuration of any computer system for
assisting the staff functions, the needs of this system should
be identified.
Although there are problems inherent in specifying the
requirements to be met by something that does not yet exist
(similar to convincing a farmer of his need for a tractor
he has never seen) , a SACS is expected to meet the following
requirements
:
1. Exchange data with other tactical data systems
2. Build and maintain data bases
3. Perform tactical analysis functions to support control
actions and decision making
4. Provide displays and graphics to support tactical
operations and daily procedures
5. Interface with detection systems
6. Provide functions to support tactical war games for
the LAF ' s senior personnel training.
Figure 2.1 presents a matrix which lists the automation





The expansion of automated assistance for staff activi-
ties is inevitably accompanied by two major problems:
1. The machine problem--that of making computing power
available to staff personnel
2. The human problem—that of motivating staff personnel
to utilize computers.
Attempting a solution to the first problem, a SACS model
will be presented which, if completed and finally implemented,
could insure the availability of computer resources throughout
the staff environment. The solution to the problem of user
motivation for exploitation of automated assistance will be
embodied in a proposed user communications pattern.
C. SACS DEFINITION
SACS must be a secure, militarized, automatic system





required for performing the receiving, filtering, processing,
storing and correlating of input data and also for printing
and disseminating the information product. This is to sup-
port the staff in increasing its productivity and the quality
of its work and to support commanders in their decision making.
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D. SACS HARDWARE COMPONENTS DESCRIPTION
SACS must have the following hardware components in order
to accomplish its intended task.
1
.
LAF Main Computer (LMC)
The LMC must provide the major computing capability
in the LAF. It must be able:
a. To maintain large data bases
b. To perform numerical calculations
c. To perform filtering
d. To perform correlation of information
e. To respond to queries
f. To support other required processes and algorithms
g. To accept and transmit messages from and to SACS users
and interoperating systems
h. To perform color graphic compositions.
The LMC can be a supermini system in order to cover
the above listed requirements, in a satisfactory way in terms
of accuracy and fast response.
2
.
The Peripheral Control Unit
The PCU must be a small scale computer capable of
3
storing messages and color graphics data, prompting for mes-
sage and color graphic composition and enabling the several
consoles to interact with the LMC and to accept messages and
pictures from the detection systems.
3The color is considered necessary to enable a vivid
illustration of maps, friendly and foe force dispositions, etc
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3. The Tactical Analysis Console (TAC)
The TAC must provide the user with the capability to
have color graphics and alphanumeric input and output with
or without an illuminated color map background and color hard-
copy output. TACs must, be connected to PCUs and must have a
color display, a keyboard, a "mouse," a printer, and a plotter.
The TAC must be capable of input and output of formatted or
free text and of providing the user with the capability to





The Large Display Panel (LCP)
The LDP must be a computer driven large screen which
will permit the integration of tactical command and control
data on a universal traverse mercator map background and must
facilitate user interaction with the data base. It must pro-
vide the user the capability to create new color displays
interactively, display information from the data base through
direct communication with the LMC or indirectly through a
connection with a PCU, update the data base, and store and
retrieve displays. The LDP must have sufficient memory for
storing the display symbology used in conjunction with standard
military maps.
5. The Geometry Engine (GE) Style Subsystem (GESS)
4The GESS must provide realistic visual simulation for
real-time manipulation of geometry and other information taken
4 See "The Geometry Engine, a VLSI Geometry System for
Graphics," by J.H. Clark, Computer Graphics , July 19 82.
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by detection systems. The GESS must output smooth continuous
curves of 2D and 3D transformations and sharp readable textual




The Detection Mapping Modulator (DMM)
The DMM must interpret the signals which are received
by the detection systems and which are interpreted locally
into radar screen videos, into target geometric elements,
and routed to the SPCU.
7. The Special Purpose Control Unit (SPCU)
The SPCU must have the capability to control the
outputs of the DMM, to compose the target information collected
by adjacent detection systems with overlapped observation
areas into integrated target information of larger areas
(e.g., the combat zone of the LAF) , and to feed appropriately
the GESS with the geometric elements of the corresponding
targets
.
8. The Common Tactical Console (CTC)
The CTC must be used for the display of, and interaction
with computer stored data. It must be a small, transportable
device capable of sending and receiving alphanumerics and
unsophisticated graphics through the PCU. The CTC must be
equipped with one color plasma display, a keyboard and a
printer. For alphanumeric data, the CTC must provide the
user the capability to display prompt message composition,
edit messages, and input and output messages in formatted
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or free text. For simple graphics data, the CTC must provide
the user with the capability to create new displays inter-
actively, display information from the database indirectly
through connection with a PCU, update the database and store
and retrieve displays of military symbology.
E. SACS HARDWARE TOPOLOGY AND WORKSTATIONS
SACS hardware components must be located at the LAF
tactical command post and at some of its subordinate echelon
commands
.
1. LAF Tactical Operation Center
a. the LMC
b. the GESS, SPCU and DMM
c. One PCU, one LDP, one TAC and one CTC
2. The Personnel Subsystem
a. One PCU
b. One CTC
















Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the workstation organizations
of the several subsystems. Some CTCs should also be given to
the subordinate commands of the LAF if the LAF happens to be
an independent brigade. If the LAF is a larger unit then it
will have subordinate LAFs having their own SACSs.
F. SACS SOFTWARE COMPONENTS DESCRIPTION
1 . Enemy Situation Applications Software
a. Enemy Situation Data (ESD)
The ESD file must contain data and intelligence
concerning enemy units, equipment, personnel, installations
and activities. The application program associated with this
file should provide for collection, storage, dissemination
and selective retrieval of current enemy information. The
major components of ESD file entries must be: intelligence
subject; combat activity; unit element, equipment and location;
morale; losses; weapon system activities; target identification
and target characteristics. Related to each ESD message should
be a list of users interested and authorized for the use of
data contained in the messaae. Users authorized interest
may be indicated in the following ways: (1) Users are speci-
fied as interested with the submission of the message; (2) An
incoming ESD message satisfies the user criteria for a standing
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request for information; (3) A reviewer of the incoming mes-
sage determines those interested in the message. Authorized
users of enemy information may indicate their interest in
messages as a means of retrieving data from the file. All
system users, collection agents and sources may and should
provide data for this application. The ECD in few words
should provide the basic intelligence reporting mechanism for
system users and should form the basis for developing enemy
order of battle, targeting and other processed intelligence.
b. Enemy Order of Battle (EOB)
The EOB file should contain processed and evalu-
ated information about enemy units and their structure. The
corresponding application program should provide the user with
the capability to enter, maintain and process enemy force
information and to identify those elements of the enemy not
yet located or whose location data is suspect. The major EOB
file entries should be: unit identification, location,
subordination, status, combat activity, and combat effectiveness
c. Filter
Filtering must be a process which should provide
the capability for checking incoming ESD data for redundancy
with the current data base.
d. Correlation
Correlation must be a process which should provide
the capability for relating new ESD data to those existing in
the database.
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2 . Friendly Situation Application Software
a. Unit Operations Report ( UOR)
The UOR will be a process which must permit auto-
matic record communication between the LAF and its subordinate
echelons with respect to enemy activity, weather, terrain
and tactical activity. Provision is to be made for entry,
dissemination, storage and selected retrieval of UOR messages.
b. Task Organization (TO)
The TO file should contain information on the
assignment and attachment of friendly forces. The corres-
ponding application program should provide the Operations Sub-
system personnel the capability to enter, retrieve, and modify
proposed changes to the task organization. This application
will also store task organization changes planned for future
use and change the TO file on order. The major TO entries
should be: Unit designation, type, subordination.
c. Tactical Dispositions (TD)
The TD file should contain geographic data related
to combat support elements, service support locations, and
certain tactical control measures. The major entries should
be unit identification, location, type of location like com-
mand post, center of mass, objectives, blocking and delay
ground points, boundaries, coordination lines, assembly areas,
etc.
32
3 . Applications Support Software
a. Battlefield Information Reports (BIR)
The BIR should contain the major subordinate com-
bat maneuver elements and other designated units. The con-
tents should include location, activity, intensity of conflict
and the commander's perception of the situation. This report
should be transmitted at specified intervals to LAF tactical
command post.
b. Management of Intelligence Collection (MIC)
The MIC should be a function which will provide
intelligence personnel with a set of files and processes to
assist the collection management procedures. The following
files should comprise the MIC: (1) Intelligence Collection
Agent ( ICA) file which will identify each collection agency
and its available collection means; (2) Intelligence Collection
Characteristics (ICC) file which will contain the range and
degree of coverage for each collection means; (3) Intelli-
gence Collection Requirements (ICR) file which will contain
data specifying the information needed and reporting criteria;
(4) Intelligence Collection Tasking (ICT) file which will
identify the specific tasking requirements assigned to each
agency
.
c. Named Area of Interest (NAI)
The NAI should be a process which will provide
users the capability of assigning a name to a geographical
point, line or area (circle) . This will permit the user in
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future queries or searches against that area to refer to it
by the given name instead of inputting several strings of
coordinates. Named areas of interest will be normally estab-
lished by echelons having the requirement to retrieve data
on given parameters.
d. Staff Working File (SWF)
The SWF should provide the staff member-user with
the capability to enter, process, store and retrieve data
which does not logically fit into other SACS files. It will
provide the user the ability to create new files to meet new
or changing conditions.
e. Terrain File (TF)
The TF should contain terrain characteristics
and the results of terrain analysis in terms of tactical
evaluation, that is, critical terrain, obstacles, observation
traf ficability , and cover and concealment. This data will be
available to all SACS users and will be graphic displays to
supplement or highlight the map backgrounds. The terrain
data will be provided by the topographical department. Staff
members-users would add other data to supplement the file.
f. Weather File (WF)
The WF should contain weather characteristics and
the results of weather analysis in terms of the weather impact
on the operations. This data will be available to all SACS
users and will be textual displays. The weather data will be
provided by the meterological department.
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g. On Line Query System (OQS)
The OQS should be a retrieval language which must
provide the SACS user with the capability to define retrieval
parameters and report output formats. Retrieval parameters
will be specified in terms of field identifiers, relational
operators, and data values. Print and display commands should
specify the output media and format. The user should be able
to sort the output, sum numeric quantities, count the number
of records meeting search criteria, and perform periodical
summaries
.
h. Center to Center Communications (CCC)
The CCC process should permit correspondence
between LMC central processors of dependent LAFs . Messages,
summaries, and processed reports could be dispatched or re-
quested. The requirements for passing information from the
lower LAF to the higher headquarters would normally be estab-
lished by directive.
4 . The Training Support Software
It is logical to assume that the LAF in garrison would
want to use SACS in a training capacity. To be able to accom-
plish training, SACS should contain a training support package
which can be used to satisfy a variety of training needs like
the command post exercises, component training exercises,
LAF ' s software checkout, and operational readiness evaluations.
To satisfy these needs, the training support software should
contain the following items.
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a. The Simulation Package
The basic design of the simulation should be able
to accommodate two or more LAFs exercising in their superior
LAF environment, a LAF exercising by itself, or the LAF '
s
staff training by itself. The simulation package must permit
battle simulation in a detailed event-sequenced logic and in
an interactive way. This package also should provide realis-
tic insights into the intelligence information processing and
decision making on the modern battlefield.
b. The Data Reduction Program
The data reduction program should be used to screen
the log tapes and extract the mission essential elements of
analysis for the particular mission being conducted. Through
analysis support, this data could be refined, analyzed, and
assembled in appropriate feedback form for presentation to the
participating staff personnel. The data reduction could be
designed so as to be used during software checkout to assure
operators that the operating system is performing up to speci-
fications. Support algorithms could also be included to pro-
vide the capability of trend analysis, comparative analysis,
and to measure overall system performance
.
c. On-Console Training Program
The on-console training program should be loaded
on SACS and used for training of the respective staff personnel
in performance of their operational responsibilities. An
embedded training program should also provide evaluation of
36
the results of the training and maintenance of training con-
duct records
.
5 . Software Distribution Matrix
The distribution matrix should permit the automatic
distribution of SACS messages based on specified message
characteristics. A message originator must designate the
message addressees either by entering the code name for each
desired addressee or by entering a single value code that
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Figure 2.5: Personnel Workstation (Up).
Intelligence or Logistics Workstation (Down)
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Ill . WORKING WITH THE SACS [1,4]
A. PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS
The personnel functions will be performed from the corres-
ponding workstation. The basic capabilities of data exchange,
data management and simple graphic displays will be available
to support the function. The personnel functions will have




The intelligence functions will be performed from the
corresponding workstation. The capabilities of data exchange,
data management, analysis assistance, interface with detection
systems and color graphic displays will be available to sup-
port the function. The new workstation will be used to re-
ceive combat information and intelligence messages, retrieve
LMC and/or GESS graphic displays and digital data requested
by the chief of staff, and to retrieve and manipulate SACS
data for evaluating, analyzing and interpreting combat infor-
mation. Most coordination within the LAF ' s comman post should
be accomplished verbally or by using hard-copied outputs be-
cause this form of communication is most efficient because of
the close proximity of the staff personnel. Control of the
content of analysis product files should be under the intelli-
gence subsystem to avoid confusion and possible contradictions.
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Within the LAF command post the intelligence functions
are performed by several staff sections. The intelligence
operations functions will use SACS primarily to be on line
with the current tactical situation and terrain data from the
corresponding files. Also supervising intelligence dissemina-
tion, coordinating the intelligence collection assets, and
determining intelligence needs will require access to LMF
and GESS graphic displays and file data. Preparation of the
intelligence annex and the formal staff briefings will require
the creation of graphic displays as well as the gathering of
current situation data. The intelligence analysis and produc-
tion function will be performed using every SACS capability.
SACS will be used to store combat information. Maneuver units,
collection agencies and detection systems will be able to
enter combat information directly into the SACS enemy situation
files. The SACS features of query, filtering and correlation
will be used to confirm, correlate and organize the combat
intelligence into a form suitable for tactical analysis. The
terrain and weather data will be used to create graphics dis-
plays showing key terrain, obstacles, observation and firing
abilities, cover and concealment, accompanied with weather
impact texts. This data augmented with those of the enemy
order of battle, can be used to determine possible avenues of
enemy approach. This data also will have utility in develop-
ing plans of action and tactical maneuvers, and for logistics
subsystem in developing supplying routes and locating depots.
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The enemy order of the battle analysis will be elaborated
using SACS. Enemy situation data will be used for determining
enemy unit identification, composition, disposition and strength
The current enemy order of the battle can be compared with the
corresponding past records to determine and display unit
identifications, enemy units arrangement, enemy unit disposi-
tion and enemy's course of action.
The enemy situation, order of battle and terrain files
will require management. Historical records and terrain and
weather features in the LAF ' s area that are no longer needed
will be deleted. The enemy situation file can grow larger
than any other file and it must be closely supervised to avoid
system overloads. The necessary deletions can be automatically
done, based on the criterion of age. Threshold indicators
must indicate the critical file size and must initiate an
automatic file pruning to maintain an acceptable file size
without ignoring the usefulness and the meaningfulness of
the file contents.
The intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance function
will use the SACS to process requests for preplanned recon-
naissance flights and to monitor the ground reconnaissance
and surveillance activities.
The security functions will use SACS to receive intelli-
gence collection tasking messages which will be translated
into specific signal intelligence indicators to be used in
tasking army security agency field teams. The signal security
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function involves monitoring friendly non-secure communications
to ascertain what information is being passed that might be
of use to the enemy. SACS communications must be over secure
channels which will not be subject to monitoring.
Figure 3.1 presents a gross data flow diagram for the
intelligence subsystem using SACS.
C. OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS
The operations functions will be performed from the corres-
ponding workstation. The capabilities of data exchange, data
management, analysis assistance, color graphic displays and
war games for training, will be available to support the func-
tion. The new workstation will be used in developing the
friendly situation, unit status, tactical estimate, maneuver-
ing forces control, and supervision of operations in compliance
with the General's decisions. The overall LAF's operational
status will be developed, stored and displayed and/or printed
on demand. Tasks organization for supporting the maneuvering
forces should be extracted, presented and reviewed as part of
the operational status. The SACS database will be used to
assemble an overall operations estimate for the Commanding
General . The input sources for developing this estimate will
be the enemy situation information as they have been filtered,
evaluated, and correlated by the intelligence subsystem; the
battlefield information about the friendly forces as they will
be submitted in periodical reports by the subordinate echelons
of the LAF; other information arriving from other friendly
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sources as the superior or adjacent LAF . All this data must be
logically augmented by the existing relevant database, in
displays and/or hardcopies. Free text summaries must be
added to explain the graphical presentations and both graphics
and displays will form the operations estimate required by
the General. Supportive courses of action can also be pre-
pared and presented along with the estimate. The course of
action should include: the type of action to be taken, time
the action will begin, location of the action, use of the
available means and purpose of the action. Changing tactical
requirements needed to support the maneuvering plan, task
organization, fire and engineering support will be detected
by monitoring of the superior LAF networks and SACS situational
displays. As tactical changes are identified, they need to
be assessed in terms of criticality and developed into appro-
priate courses of action. Approved plans must be formed into
orders, modified operations overlays, and updated SACS files
necessary to implement the approved plan.
The operations subsystem tactical planners must use its
workstation to develop on consoles, future courses of action
to satisfy the General's guidance. Graphically developed
courses of action may be assembled and stored in planning
files and briefed to the General using the LDP console.
Graphical and textual compositions will be invaluable in
generating and storing courses of LAF ' s action to different
tactical situations. Here it must be remembered that
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unforeseen enemy action can decoordinate the LAF. The above
composition will prevent such an undesirable situation and it
will contribute to the stability of the system (LAF)
.
Operations subsystem will use its workstation to maintain
the current estimate by quering and establishing information
requests against the database. Assembled data can be organized
graphically to demonstrate enemy and friend frontlines, boun-
daries of echelons, command posts and tactical maneuvering
positions, barriers and obstacles, nuclear and chemical strikes.
Preplanned air support requests should be processed using
the staff working file. The air support planning will be helped
considerably by the displays on the LDP of the detection sys-
tems, display's graphical and textual information about the
air tactical situation, giving the target itself; route,
height, and speed of flight; identification of friend, foe,
unknown, etc. This way the planner will have complete and
precise information on how much an echelon or area suffers from
enemy air force attacks, a fact which is of high importance
in planning air support requests.
Figure 3.2 presents a gross data flow diagram for the
operations subsystem using SACS.
D. LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS
The logistics functions will be performed from the corres-
ponding workstation. The capabilities of data exchange, data
management, analysis assistance and graphic displays will be
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available to support the functions. The system graphics will
be used to form the displays and hardcopies of significant
logistical events for briefing the General. These displays
showing obstacles, key terrain, roads, rivers, air strips,
friendly and enemy unit locations, will be used to determine
the main supply route and supply points. Once developed, all
this information will be stored in SACS files for future
reference. Area damage control, maintaining the status of
supplies, vehicles, and equipment necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the mission will be handled using SACS. Data will be
gathered and organized by SACS and algorithms will be provided


























IV. SECURITY AND SACS [6,7,8]
A. SACS SECURITY INTO PERSPECTIVE
Computer fraud and abuse in the private sector creates
newspaper headlines since these crimes usually involve large
amounts of money. But analogous crimes in a military system
(e.g., SACS) may go completely undetected, even though the
potential for damage to the national security is much more
serious. The reason for this lack of detection is that when
information is leaked electronically it does not disappear;
the original remains intact and unaltered and there may be
no evidence that it has been copied.
Computer systems have not been very good at keeping secrets
It is too easy to demonstrate that an opponent can penetrate
the protection mechanism of typical operating systems, gain
control of the machine, and obtain any information he wishes.
The only reliable approach is to prevent an opponent from
gaining access to the computer system. This can be typically
accomplished by locking up the computers and clearing all the
people who use them to the level of the most sensitive data
on the machine. This approach is at least inconvenient.
Operational problems occur when information cannot be made
available quickly to users who need it because of too tight
restrictions on access to the system. For this reason, several
models of computer security have been developed in the past
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which must be the milestone concepts in SACS security. These




The basic security condition has to restrict a user
from reading information classified above his clearance. Thus
the system must keep track of the levels and compartments
associated with the files used by a job during a session.
Whenever a new file is created, it must be marked with the
appropriate security level and all the compartments of the
file used so far. Only certain authorized users will be able




The access matrix has to describe the system in terms
of its subjects and objects. Subjects are usually processes
operating at the direction of a user. Objects are files and
the kinds of access that subjects may have to files. Sub-
jects will be listed as the rows of a matrix and the objects
as its columns, so each entry of the matrix tells what access
a subject is allowed to an object.
3 Security Kernel
The security kernel exploits the concept of a "reference
monitor" as a basis for developing a secure operating system.
The reference monitor would check each reference by a subject
to an object and be sure that it is authorized by the access
matrix. The mechanism that handles the reference monitor has
to be tamperproof, invoked on every reference, and subjected
53
to complete analysis and test. The security kernel of the
SACS must be composed of its reference validation mechanism,
access control, security-related functions and nothing else.
Two axioms must govern the security kernel concept: (a) No
user may read information classified above his clearance,
and (b) No user may lower the classification of information
(no "Read Up," no "Write Down").
B. SECURITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE OF SACS
For a developer embarking on a new project that requires
a system like SACS to restrict some of its information from
some of its users, there still is no approach that guarantees
absolute success. To assume invulnerability of SACS as a
result of a good security program is like assuming that a car
will never run out of gas because it has a gas gauge. However,
a good security program is a necessity and there are at least
three doctrines for the SACS developer who faces the need to
separate computer users with different clearances and data
with different classifications. These three most significant
doctrines are strongly related to the SACS life cycle.
1 . Security and the Study Phase
The security requirements of the SACS must be con-
sidered together with its functional requirements. Security
is not something that can be added to an existing design even
though often security seems separate from function. The
intelligence subsystem must, for example, deliver tactical
information, and security imposes the constraint that certain
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parts must not be delivered to the logistics subsystem. It
is tempting to divorce the function from the constraint.
Viewed at the top level, however, the requirement is for a
system that delivers the intelligence information in a way
that does not compromise it. Security requirements can
affect the entire structure of the SACS software and thus needs
to be considered at the highest level of design.
2 . Security Throughout the Design and Development Phase
It is crucial to identify and state the security re-
quirements clearly. But it is still necessary to pay close
attention to the techniques used in designing and building
the SACS. The functions of the SACS must be studied, focusing
on the requirements for the flow of classified information,
and on the conditions under which classified information is
to be disclosed, modified, reclassified or to enter or leave
the SACS. The first step can be a simple informal but precise
model of the information flow and authority in the SACS. Such
a model could help both developers and users in understanding
what is to be enforced. The second step must be the use of
hierarchical specifications for the design. A top level
specification that will reflect the SACS structure and infor-
mation flow, as well as a program specification to allow
personnel to review and assess the information flow and
authorization mechanisms, should be included in these hierachi-
cal specifications. The third step must be the choice of
hardware that reduces security problems. Generally hardware
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should provide good mechanisms for isolating different compu-
tations, simple and efficient ways to control the flow of
information between isolated contexts, and a uniform way of
treating different kinds of objects (e.g., SACS files)
.
Features such as virtual memory, a device interface that
offers the possibility of a uniform treatment of memory, and
the ability to change addressing contexts rapidly will help
in the implementation of a secure SACS. Several machine
states that restrict access to critical portions of the instruc-
tion set are not required if all accesses to data are mediated
by the virtual memory mechanism, but they should be used as
another way of protecting critical operating system data, for
example the contents of the mapping registers. The fourth
step must be the choice of programming languages for which
there exists a reliable and well verified compiler. The final
step must be the construction of test plans with specific
attention to the security requirements of the system. Testing
is an important way of establishing confidence that the con-
trols implemented are in fact effective.
3 . Security and Software Engineering Techniques
Systems like SACS that must enforce military security
often have a requirement that others lack. Not only must the
builder and the user be satisfied with the correct functioning
of the system, but it must be possible to convince the certi-
fying agent that this is in fact the case. This consideration
makes it imperative that the software be designed, implemented,
and documented according to software engineering principles.
56
C. SURVIVABILITY OF THE SACS
One very important feature which must characterize SACS is
its survivability after a possible component failure. It is
easily understood how destructive the unavailability of SACS
would be in a case where the tactical situation does not permit
a rapid switching to the manual system. So one criterion for
designing a highly secure SACS is to ensure its continued
reliable operation and availability. A survivable SACS should
provide for "grateful degradation; " a SACS with failed com-
ponents should continue to provide service even at reduced
levels. A survivable SACS should be designed so that a failed
component could be taken off-line, repaired and placed back
on-line, all while the system should provide uninterrupted
service. One key for SACs survivability must be "redundancy."
If a component fails, then an equivalent component must pick
up the slack. Multiprocessing will be important in any
survivable SACS. Other features which should be considered
in order to achieve survivability of SACS are:
1. Incorporation of fail-safe mechanisms into the firmware
rather than in software
2. Use of transparent multiprocessing; this allows perfor-
mance upgrades without software modifications
3. Use of multiple input/output subsystems
4
.
Incorporation of major portions of the operating system
into hardware




D. NETWORKING THE SACS WITH SECURITY
It has been stated in Chapter II that a SACS is expected
to exchange data with other tactical data systems. This ex-
pectation can be met by networking the SACSs of related LAFs
using the packet switching technique. The means for attaining
security in the packet switched communications system is the
concept of the end-to-end encryption. An end-to-end encryp-
tion is an apparent need in order to protect the exchanged
information since all the exchanged messages will be out of
the physical control of the communicators. In an end-to-end
encryption, the sender encrypts the message and it remains
encrypted while being transmitted through a network until it
is received and decrypted by the receiver. A device called
a PLI (private line interface) should be placed between the
host LMC and the packet switches as it is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.2 shows the PLI layout. The PLI will encrypt the
data in each packet, leaving the header in the clear. The
switches will route the packets, but the actual data will be
encrypted. As a result, when packets will pass throught
the switches, operators will not be able to examine the data
in encrypted form nor will misrouted packets be able to divulge
classified data. All the switches must be placed in military
sites and can be manned by the same cleared personnel who
maintain the SACS. The encryption devices will be keyed by
using the same keys for a user community and different keys
for other communities; in this way the communications system
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will be partitioned into "communities of interest." The
maintenance of the switches can be performed by the operators
of the nearest SACS being interconnected. The switches
themselves are computers quite small and inexpensive, and about
as complicated as a peripheral controller. Since the tech-
nology and complexity is about that of a small piece of digital
gear, the additional maintenance load on the SACS operators
will be quite small. The PLIs can be collocated with the
SACS terminals, or if multiplexers or concentrators are used,
the PLIs can be placed at the access point to the switch,
provided that multiplexers and concentrators are multilevel-
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V. FACING THE END USER PROBLEM [7,9,10,11]
A. THE END USERS OF THE SACS
When SACS is introduced, it will be necessary that cer-
tain principles of automated systems should be understood by
the LAF commander, staff members and other end users who will
be affected by it. To a large extent success or disappoint-
ment is dependent on these end users, their involvement in
the definition and logical modeling of the data, their employ-
ment of end-user database language and their acceptance of the
results and the principle of shared data.
The term "end user" is used to describe someone who inter-
acts with a computer in one way or another. This term is too
broad and covers an enormous range of skills and, unless it
is further qualified, may be used to describe almost anyone
in the LAF that will use the SACS in some kind of data proces-
sing. It is worth listing the ways in which a person may be
considered an end user.
1. The Recipient of Regular SACS-Generated Reports
Nearly everyone connected with some form of automatic
data processing uses such forms. Frequently these reports are
adequate to the needs of the reader. However, it is often
the case that hours are wasted in performing simple analyses





Although there would appear to be no limit to the
ability of an application programmer to obtain the desired
data, this is frequently not the case. An application pro-
grammer, because of the amount of technical programming detail
that must be mastered, is frequently "locked" into one system;
a computer, programming language or operating system. A lack
of understanding between the applications programmer and the




Users of Interactive Database Query Languages
Such users will be the majority of the SACS' users.
Their ability to extract the data they want will be limited
by the power of the query language and their skill at using
it. The problem is that there is no standard query language
and such users may have to learn different languages--something
that could be avoided. This is the main topic of this chapter.
The use of a good general-purpose database query language
will be of general benefit because it will be easy for naive
end users to learn, and because it will provide the rapid
access to data and quick writing of application programs that
these users require.
B. THE QUERY LANUAGE
A mistake that is frequently made is to confuse the com-
plexity of a language with its power. If the power of a
language refers to its ability to control the hardware on which
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it is run, this confusion may be justified because the current
hardware is inherently complicated. However if power means
the ability to provide an abstract description of a compu-
tational process, there is no reason that this should entail
a language with complicated syntax or constructs. LISP and
PROLOG may not be the ideal languages for end users in the LAF
community, but they are among the most powerful (in the second
sense) and there aren't languages with a simpler syntax.
Database access languages may be broadly divided into those
that are powerful but difficult to learn, and those that are
limited but easy to learn. However there is a non-procedural
(so very easy to learn) query language which is quite power-
ful also. This is Query-By-Example (QBE) which is associated
with the relational database model.
It is desirable that the staff member (being generally a
naive user) approaching a terminal should be required to know
as little as possible in order to qet started. He may have to
know a little more in order to use the subtleties of a language,
but this also should be minimized. He may approach a database
knowing very little about the names of the records, of fields
(attributes) , or how to access them. The best means of ex-
plaining the user language functions is by examples. Various
psychological studies of QBE have shown that naive users acquire
the skill to make complicated queries in less than three hours.
The language is designed with the excellent principle that
the thinking process the user follows is the same as he would
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use to find the same information without a computer. More-
over, the effectiveness of QBE will never disappoint a staff
member who happens to know a lot about computers and database. '
There are certain extensions of QBE like the QBPE (Query
by Picture Example) that could be extremely useful for staff
members if they want to create graphs with map areas such as
the maneuver plans for example. Another extension of QBE
is the PBE (Procedures by Example) which covers a wide area
of SACS applications. QBPE is based on an integrated database
system interfaced with an image analysis system. By using
pattern recognition and image processing manipulation func-
tions, pictorial descriptions can be extracted from images.
These extracted descriptions and inherent registrations of
pictures are then integrated into a relational database; the
original two-dimensional pictures are kept in a separate picture
store. Thus, queries concerning pictures can be manipulated
through the relational database, eliminating the need to
process vast amounts of imagery data. If a user's request
can be expressed in terms of the extracted picture descrip-
tions, there is no need to retrieve and process the original
pictures. If, on the other hand, the stored information is
not sufficient, all pictures satisfying selection criteria can
J. Ullman in his book Data Base Principles , CSP 19 82,
pp. 20 7-20 8, proves the power of QBE.
J. Martin, in his book An End User Guide to Data Base ,
1983, pp. 99-101, presents 170 lines of a COBOL program for
an inquiry that can be handled with one screen by QBE.
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be retrieved from the picture store and processed until the
required precision is obtained. Figure 5.1 presents the data-
flow diagram of the QBPE background. Using QBPE is the SACS,
most queries could be specified from relations which will be
parts of a database comprised of land images and digitized
maps. In Office Procedures by Example (OPBE) there are
primarily four major components beyond the QBE database manage-





Whereas the fundamental data object in QBE is a table,
in OPBE the objects are forms, reports, charts and documents,
all of which can be created, edited and sent to other nodes
of the system.
2 Communication Subsystem
In order to communicate in the form of the above
described objects to various nodes of the system (such as the
related LAFs being connected through a network) , we must have
a communication subsystem. For each node of the network there
exists a local database with the ability to access centrally
shared databases.
3 Triggers
A basic necessity in any office automation is the
ability of the system to take automatic actions whenever
certain conditions, times or events are met. In doing so the
user can automate much of the routine procedures, thus devoting
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his time to more advanced tasks. The following are some
actions that we may want to automate:
Deferring of certain messages
- Creation of various logs
Automatic inventory replenishment requests
Follow-up procedures (for example if an answer is not
received within 2 hours, the user will be alerted)
.
Complicated boolean and arithmetic operations can be
formulated using the condition boxes of the OPBE & OBPE
The text processing in the OPBE is harder than that of
incorporating arithmetic. This problem can be solved by a
good interface between the QBE and a suitably structured
editor
.
At the level of the user interface QBE is extremely
well engineered, exploiting color graphics and screen control
for ease of data entry. It leaves the user in no doubt about
the data model (relational) that is in use; relations are
visible tables. The programming environment, the means by
which data and queries are stored and recalled, is also ex-
tremely well thought out.
C. THREE PROBLEM SOLVING SCENARIOS
To show the utilization of the user communication interface
in intelligence production, three trivial examples of using
QBE and its extensions, are presented. The intention of the
examples is to demonstrate to the staff members a typical
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interaction session rather than to present truly valid algorithms
for the corresponding procedures.
1 . Identification of Missiles in a Firing Event
The hypothetical problem of the missile event can be
described as:
a. Identify the missile as a known configuration
b. Identify the missile as a new system
c. Produce a report of the parameters of the event.
The data available about the event include:
a. Launch Site: Rplace, USSR Missile Launch Facility
b. RV Impact: Gplace, Greece
c. 2 stage ignition:
Altitude = 30 km over Bplace, Bulgaria
Time = . 4 hours
The user sitting at the terminal is presented with






The user knows that there is a "MISSILE" record and he wants




"P." stands for "Print." The terminal may respond increasing
the number of columns as necessary:
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
(3)
The user wants to know what missiles have two ignition
stages, so he types:
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
P. P. 2 P. P. (4)
The values of the fields are then listed in the corresponding
columns
:
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
H101 4 500 km 17 km
SRBM H101J 2 4000 km 17 km
D4 2000 km 14 km
D5 1500 km 12 km
DDEO 1000 km 7 km
(5)
The user knows from his maps that the distance between Rplace
and Gplace is 1500 km. So the information obtained so far is
not enough since (5) gave four types of missiles of two igni-
tion stages that could strike Gplace. It is clear that the
user's query to identify the missile cannot be answered by
reference to one type of record. With QBE he can display
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two or more different skeletons on the screen at once. He
fills in both of them and then presses the ENTER key (or
equivalent) indicating that this is one entry. In our example,
knowing the 2nd ignition altitude and time, he can call a
second record having the trajectory elements of the missiles.
Thus he combines the two records as follows:
TRAJECTORY MTYPE TTYPE STAGE ALTITUDE TIME
X 2 30 km .4 h
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
P. X P. 2 P. P.
(6)
The terminal will respond
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
SRBM 7 D4 2 2000 km 14 km (7)
Now the user's query has been answered after following a
very simple procedure.
Suppose that instead of (5), we had the (5') listing
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
NULL NULL 2 NULL NULL (5')
SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missile
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In this case the user could insert the new system as follows
TRAJECTORY MTYPE TTYPE STAGE ALTITUDE TIME
I . NEW p 2 30 km .4 h
(6')
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
I. UNKNOWN NEW 2 1500 + p
"I." is used for insertions. In this last case, the user
inserts the data he has with respect to this new system. In
the columns, he has no data, so he inserts the words "UNKNOWN,"
"NEW," "1500+," "?." When he obtains additional information
he can update the records as follows ("U." is used for update)
.
TRAJECTORY MTYPE TTYPE STAGE ALTITUDE TIME
U. D4 PARABOLA 2 30 km .4 h
(V)
MISSILE CLASS TYPE STAGE RANGE RADIUS
U. SRBM D4 2 2000 km 14 km
Using QBE the user can also delete data ("D."), link tables,
retrieve data under conditions specified by him. The database
administrator can assign authorizations to certain users and
he can also impose constraints. These control and integrity
features of QBE are very desirable in the SACS case, and they
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can be elaborated in accordance with the SACS security general
fame
.
2 . Creation of a Graph of the LAF ' s Vital Area
The TAC using the QBPE facilities can read its color
map background which can be stored in a digital form in a
separate picture store. Most queries would be specified from
o
the following relations:
CITIES (FRAME, CITY-ID, XI, X2,Y1,Y2)
CITYNAME (FRAME, CITY-ID, NAME)
ROAD (FRAME, R0-1D, XA,XB,YA,YB)
RO-NAME ( FRAME, R0-1D, NAME)
MOUNTAIN (FRAME, MOUN-ID, XMl , XM2 ,XM3,XM4 , YMl , YM2 , YM3 , YM4
)
etc. including all the necessary information for the
production land features. X and Y describe the required
corresponding 2D coordinates. The "FRAME" is represented
by a number that corresponds to a certain portion of the
original map image.
Suppose the user wants to sketch the vital area within
certain boundaries specified by the land features. This query
can be formulated as follows:






For a complete analysis of the concept, see:
Query Languages for Pictorial DB Systems," by N.S




































The system will respond with an intermediate result table for
all the boundary segments of the vital area:
Rl XI Yl ... XN YN
X Y . . . Z W (10)
The user wants to draw the roads which are in the vital area





The command "S." stands for "Sketch" so the user will type
"S." in (10) and (11) as follows:
Rl XI Yl ... XN YN
S. X Y • • • Z W
ROAD FRAME RO-lD NAME




The system will respond presenting on the screen the sketch-
picture of the vital area with the specified roads. The user
could ask for the drawing of the rivers, hills etc., according
to his need. The user exploiting the other graphic capabili-
ties of the TAC can enrich his sketch by drawing friendly and
enemy dispositions, avenues of approach, points of interest,
etc., and by adding textual explanations for his reports.
Currently the pictorial operators used to contrast
pictorial entities are as listed below:
Pictorial Union of two given regions: UNI0N-R1R2
Pictorial Intersection of two given regions: INT-R1R2
Compute the length of a given line: LENGTH-L
Compute the perimeter of a given region: LENGTH-R
Compute the area of a given region: AREA-R
These operators are intended to construct only the basic
relations among points, lines and regions for queries concern-
ing pictorial information. Depending on the application re-
quirements, user-supplied operators can be implemented for
more efficient operation.
3 . Sending A Message to the Superior LAF/G3
Suppose that the G3 of our LAF wants to send the
maneuvering plan for approval to the superior LAP. This can be
9done using the capabilities of OPBE as follows.
9 See "A Language for Office & Business Automation" by
M. Zloof, Office Automation Conference Digest , March, 1980,
pp. 240-260.
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SEND A,B to G3
Everything presented here in plain English could have been
encrypted.
After presenting the new work stations to the staff
members and after explaining some of the important user
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communication concepts, they will quickly perceive the advan-
tages of SACS; nearly all the information resources they
might require are readily available from their work station.
They will be able to retrieve documents that relate to their
job and insert relevant analysis products in their reports.
They will be able to generate messages and on-line reports for
those who need to use the results of their work. They will
have convenient facilities for presenting and routing on-line
requirements for additional information collection.
Whereas the staff member will be in the beginning
mildly amazed with the versatility he has observed in the
workstation equipment, he will soon experience the potential
of the new horizons offered by a friendly, trustworthy and







































VI. INTELLIGENCE INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING [13]
A. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM
It is clear that every staff activity in the LAF is ex-
clusively based on the intelligence subsystem during the
war time. The operations and logistics plans are formed using
the timely evaluated information about the enemy's location,
strength, capability, vulnerability and intentions. If this
information is accurate then we can make good, more or less,
plans. But if the information we have is not accurate enough,
then it is not possible to make good plans and good decisions,
no matter how good staff officers or inspired leaders that
we have. The old characterization of Clausewitz seems to
still be appropriate: "...a great part of the information
obtained in war is contradictory, a greater part is false,
and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful." Modern
improvements in intelligence sensors have almost embarrassingly
exploded the amount of data collected, but the information
is still enormously variable—mainly because this advance in
sensor technology has been countered by enemy concealment
and deception sophistication. The intelligence expert cannot
know the location, activity and intention of every unit in
the enemy army, but if enough is located the rest must be
inferred. The theoretical question is--how much he has to
know to be able to infer the rest?
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A LAF has many sources of data. There are the forward
units, observers, and patrols reporting enemy type, activity
and strength. Prisoner interrogation and agents are another
source. There are radio intercepts, visual, magnetic-acoustic
and radar sensors associated with all LAFs. The use of
aircraft, overflying the enemy, generates another avalanche
of data. The intelligence analyst must look for signals in
the presence of noise or deception. Camouflage netting for
example tends to obscure the size, shape and color of covered
objects from visual observation. The analyst must expand his
examination to consider reports of other activities that may
be germane to the event of interest. A report of an armored
brigade in the area, for example, might give support to the
belief that an object under camouflage is a tank. There is
the occurrence of frequent transformation between the detec-
tion of any event and the final assessment. Figure 6.1 pre-
sents this sequence. The first transformation (P, ) occurs
as some sensor detects physical stimuli received from a
special characteristic of the target. The second transfor-
mation (P ) takes place as the interpreter perceiving the
size and shape may report possibly one armored vehicle. The
third transformation (P ) may identify it as a tank; the fourth
(P.) the model and type of tanks in the force. The fifth
(P. , ) transformation might be the identification of the
force as the "X" Armored Division commanded by General "Y".
If the enemy strategically places tank silhouettes to give
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the illusion that tanks are present, a whole series of errors
can result. On the other hand, the expansion of the probability
trees for the enormous numbers of events we will have from the
sensors will make the use of SACS a brute force approach,
inevitably prone to combinatorial explosion if methodologies
are not applied to establish the basis for the design of an
appropriate data processing system for military intelligence
purposes. Thus the objective of this chapter is to develop
some mathematical models that:
Can minimize the harmful effects of incomplete and
unreliable data.
Can facilitate the information inference from the
existing data.
Can be the basis of further research for a better
simulation of the intelligence problems.
B. THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL
Suppose there is a critical flank which must be held.
Let X and Y represent the level of forces on each side. The
value of X should be proportional to the value of Y since this
is imposed by the tactic doctrines. In addition, the change
of X force, because of casualties, is proportional to the
absolute size of the opposing force. These relations can be






If we add these equations we'll have:





If we say that k, + k„ = k, then:
X + X" = k-Y or
X' = k-Y - X
This equation assumes perfect information of X about Y. If
X is not sure of Y force level and has to estimate or infer
from intelligence (this is often the case) , this equation
can still be used by using estimate terms involving the mean
(l_i) and variance (a)











We can go further and enrich the equations with factors of
land morphology, weather impact, etc., in order to make a
more representative model . Finally the general form of this
equation will be:
X' = f (X,Y,Z, . . .)
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We can write a FORTRAN program to find approximate
solution to this first order differential equation with
initial condition X (Y=0) = 0, using Euler ' s method. Euler's
method assumes that during the interval [Y,Y+AY) , X 1 remains
constant and that
AX/AY = X' = f(X,Y) -*
* AX = AY-f (X,Y) .
Thus
XNe„ " X01d + AX " X01d + AY
- f(X01d' Y01d»
Or stating this as a difference equation:
X.^, = X. + AY- (X. ,Y.
)
(1)l+l l 11
for i = 0,1,..., N. The FORTRAN program is:
READ N, DELTAY, Y, X
PRINT, X,Y
DO 10 I = 1,N
Y = Y + DELTAY
C Use equation (1)





The change of Y in discrete units 1,...,N expresses the rein-
forcements of Y in terms of, say, battalions. Of course
F(X,Y) = f(X,Y) must be defined in a FUNCTION subprogram.
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For a fixed value of Y. we can have an error which increases
2
as AY increases and is of the order of (AY) .
It must be stated here that there is a bias against y and
a for this kind of problems. In the following picture, the
solid and dotted distribution have the same y and a. However




In addition, another question, equally reasonable, is how
representative are monotonic functions in expressing the
dynamics of the critical flank. In any case this model is
very tractable analytically and there are a lot of things
that could be done in this vein.
C. THE TARGET DETECTION MODEL
Suppose we detected a group of enemy targets with a low
resolution radar sensor. The display shows just "blobs."
The question is, "Are they tanks or artillery, or some mix-
ture of both?" We decide to make four trials with another
high resolution sensor to identify each one of the four
"blobs." If our awareness or indifference is such that it is
equally likely that they are tanks or artillery, Figure 6.2
shows there are 16 possible outcomes to the four trials.
83
Suppose the results of the first three independent trials
were "tank, artillery, tank." To the question, "What is
the possibility that the fourth try is a tank?", the answer
is 1/2. In other words, by considering the permutations of
trials as the probability space, we can't learn anything.
Instead of this from our knowledge of the enemy's organization,
we can express our indifference by equal likelihood in terms
of distributions, namely, that it could be eitehr 100% tanks,
75% tanks, 50% tanks- 25% tanks or 0% tanks, and make them
equal in probability (Figure 6.3) . Now if our experience
on the first three trials was "tank, artillery, tank" then
the probability of the fourth trial being a tank is 3/5 = .6.
In other words, if we condition the probability space through
the use of distribution of ratios, we learn more.
D. THE "TWO LOOKS" MODEL
The previous model assumes that there is a final sensor
which makes the identification of tank and artillery decisive
and correct. This is not usually the case. It is often
necessary in identifying a target to make repeated trials
and combine ancillary data with detection data. We can set up
a decision theory model which will give us probabilistic
limits involved in looking at the same target with multiple
sensors. The question is, "What is the payoff for multiple
sensors?", or, "If we make repeated trials with low quality
sensors, do we in fact gain?" Or, "Shall we define a detec-
tion as the union of two sensors or the intersection of two
sensors?"
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The analysis would be:
Let
p = "a priori" probability that a target is in
the area
P, = Probability to detect a target given that the
target is present
P = Probability to detect a target given that the
target is not present.




+ (1 " P
n
} (1 " p)
'
and the probability of making a wrong decision:
P
w
= 1 " P R = (l-Pd )'P + d-p)'Pn
If L, is the loss associated with a Type I error
(a = (1 -P.) «p) and L is the loss associated with a Type II
error (3 = (1 -p) *Pn ) , the expected loss for a wrong decision
is
E(L) = a-L + 3-L
Let's start with the assumption that the target is detected
if it is detected with either sensor A or sensor B or both,
that is (A u B) . The improvement "I" can be defined as in
Figure 6.5, which in percentage terms becomes:
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P(1-P H (A) ) •P-.(B) L 1 -(l-p)Pr,(B) (1-P (A) -L,
I[(AUB)
'
A] 10 ° X p(l-Pd (A))-L1+ (l-p)Pn (A)-L2
'
Let's now quantify a question that often arises. Suppose
we suspect that there is a target in the data batch from the
sensors. The sensor being used has a fairly low probability
of catching it. How much do we gain by adding a second sensor
also of low catching probability? Assuming that P
_
(A) = P, (B)
= P., and that P (A) = P (B) = P , we have:d n n n
p(l-P,) •P-.-L-.-d-p)? (1-P ) -L 9
I[(AuB),A] = 100 x Jf a j- n » £
Assuming also that P = .3, L. = 50, L„ = 10, p e [.1,19],
and P, e [.1,19], we can have some sample curves with a
simple BASIC program (see Appendix A) . Two looks are not
always better than one. We could require that both trials
A and B (A u B) detect a target before a target is said to
have been detected. Such a procedure would decrease the
number of false alarms at the cost of missing more targets
If detection by both A and B (A n B) is required, then
Pd (AnB) = Pd (A) • Pd (B) and
P (A n B) = P (A) • P (B)
n n n




E(L(AnB)) = p(l-P,(A)P,(B) ) -L, + (l-p)P (A) P (B)-L„uu i nn 2.
The equation of improvement is
I[(AnB),A] = (E(L(A) - E ( L ( A n B) ) ) /E (L ( A)
)
or
p-P, (A) (1-P (B)) •L
1
+ (l-p)P„(A) (1-P (B)) -L
T - inn y d 2 1 n n 2
p(L-P (A) ) -L +(l-p)P (A) -L
Again for a range of reasonable values of p, P , , P , L, and
L„, we can have some sample curves that show that in any
case we have improvement detecting by both A and B sensors
.
The possibilities of using three or four trial combinations
using the intersection concept is obvious.
E. THE "WHAT THE ENEMY IS GOING TO DO" MODEL
If whether the enemy will cross, for example, a river is
a possibility whether or not it is true, can be regarded as
hypotheses and the data from the intelligence subsystem can
be related to the hypothesis. In a simple example, we can
make the following formalism:
H = hypothesis that the enemy will cross the river
H' = hypothesis that the enemy will not cross the river
D = data from the intelligence subsystem
B = the intelligence background
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P(h|b) = probability assigned to the truth of H
given the truth of B
P(H|D,B) = probability assigned to the truth of H
given the truth of D and B
P(D|H,B) = probability assigned to the truth of D
given the truth of H and B.
Now we want an expression for P(h|d,B) in terms of H, D, B
and H' because we want to accept, reject, or modify the
hypothesis in light of the data from the field under differ-
ent states of knowledge. This expression will be a Bayes
equation:
P(H|D,B) = P(D|H,B)*P(H|B)
P(D|H,B) *P(D|B) + P (DlH* ,B) *P(H ' I B)
In order to make the scenario more realistic, let us assign
the following concrete meanings of the above formalism.
P(H|B) = the analyst's assignment of probability
to H after reviewing the background B
P(H'|B) = the analyst's assignment of probability
to H ' after reviewing the background B
P(H|D,B) = the probability of H after data from the
field
P(D|H,B) = the probability assigned to the truth
of the data from the field, assuming the
truth of H and B
P(D|H',B) = the probability assigned to the truth of
data from the field assuming that B is
true and H is false or H ' is true.
Now we want to know whether P(H|D,B) goes to "0" or to "1"
or stays unchagned. In other words, we want P(H|D,B) to move
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to "0" or to "1". This is because, if I have a hypothesis
that doesn't move, I had better set up another more sensitive
hypothesis. To make this point of view clearer, by diving
the right side of Bayes ' equation through by the numerator,
we have:
P(H| D,B)





P(D H' ,B) * (1-P(H B) )
P(D H,B) *P(H B)
Dividing this ratio through by P(D|h',B) we have
P =
1 - P(H B)
1 +
P(D H,B) *P (H B)
P(D H' ,B)




This is an equation of low resolving power, but in the con-
text of this point of view, two issues can be made clearer:
1. Suppose we developed the hypothesis, but the background
was such that P(H|B) was only 1/2. The question is: "How
can I get my hypothesis closer to certainty ("1") or to
uncertainty ("0")?" Say that P(H|D,B) = .8. If I solve the
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preceding equation, the ratio P ( D | H ,B) /P (D | H ' , B) must be
equal to 4. This means the data from the field D must be
4*B truer on H than it is on H', in light of the intelligence
background B. It is clear from this that a prudent indiffer-
ent hypothesis must collect a lot of critical experimental
data.
2. An equivalent but perhaps more graphic illustration can
be set up this way: Suppose P(H|B) = .8, which means we are
pretty sure from B that the enemy will cross the river. After
we get the data from the field, we find that P(d|h,B) = .5,
and P(D|H',B) = .5, which might mean that the reports can't
be preferentially assigned to H or H', considering the back-














As common sense suggests, there can be no change between
P(H|B) and P(H|D,B) when
P(D|H,B) = P(D|H',B)
but we can also argue that if the data from the field cannot
change a prior hypothesis, there is in effect no learning
from the data.
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A The Probability that the 4th
T Try will be "T" is 1/2.
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The primary purpose of this study was to produce a con-
ceptual framework that would outline from a system's context
how a SACS (Staff Assistant Computer System) would be used
to support staff operations within the LAP (Large Army Forma-
tion) . Another purpose was to present some mathematical models
for assisting the intelligence inference beyond the experience
and the perception or intuition of the intelligence analyst.
Thus this study had two main objectives. The first was to
develop concepts for using a SACS to assist in accomplishing
critical functions, duties, and tasks that must be performed
within those command and control elements of the LAF which
will be affected by the introduction of the SACS. The study
in part was elaborated to provide as much detail as possible
(the interface with a LAF wasn't possible) in a conceptual
system description. This foundation is needed by developers
to continue the analysis to the next level of a detailed study
dealing with the behavior and skills associated with the
design, development, and use of the several sets of hardware
and software.
Through the analytical effort involved in satisfying the
first objective of the study, it was possible to identify
critical command and control duties related to the military
intelligence, that appeared impossible to perform effectively
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given current manual procedures and projected SACS software
capabilities. Thus identification of the need for new tools
to support the intelligence inference constituted the second




»»» PROGRAM LISTING *
10 REM A PLOT OF THE "I" V3 "FD" FOP. REASONABLE VALUES OF "P"
If REM IH THE CASE OF THE UNION OF TUO SENSORS A.B: IA li B)
TO LET Ll=50
30 LET L2»10
->0 LET PN = . 3
50 FOE P = . 1 TO . ? STEP . 1
5 2 LPRINT
5 3 LPRINT
57 LPRINT UNION OF TUO SENSORS"
53 LPRINT '•?% = ": INT(?« 100)
5 3 LPRINT " -10% 0\ 35%'
oO LPRINT " Improvement! I ;
=1 FOR ?D=. 1 TO . 9 STEP .
1
"0 LET U- (?'. 1 - F I> MFE" LI- ( 1-P ) ?»! ( 1-PN ) «LC )* 100
30 LET A = P»
(
1-PD ) »L1* ( 1-? I »?N»L1
9 LET I=U/A




10 P.EM A PLOT OF THE " I " 7S "PD" FOP. REASONABLE VALUES OF "P"
15 REM IN THE CASE OF THE INTERSECTION OF TUO SENSORS A.B: (A fl B)
CO LET Ll=50
30 LET LC=10
40 LET PN = .3
50 FOP. P*. 1 TO .9 STEP . 1
52 LPRINT
53 LPS HIT
54 LPRINT " INTERSECTION OF TUO SENSORS"
58 LPRINT "PX="; INT ( P< 100 )
5? LPRINT ' 0\ 10X 35\
60 LPRINT ' Improvement: I >•
51 FOR PD=. 1 TO . 9 STEP . 1
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80 ...LET A = P» (1-PD) *L1M1-P> *PN*L1
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